3876 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Brian Smith
b60a0b5521 Remove extraneous "*/" in comments. 2018-12-06 10:50:33 -10:00
Brian Smith
6206823c7f Unify asm vs C fallback implementation selection.
These functions are used mutually-exclusively and even compiled
mutually-exclusively.

This also removes a build warning on targets where aes.c is empty;
they were complaining that aes.o (rightly) doesn't define anything
for those targets.

This makes the code more like BoringSSL's; they had made a similar
change before.
2018-12-04 18:24:13 -10:00
Brian Smith
953be035ff Replace GFp_bn_mul_mont_check_num_limbs with Rust. 2018-11-29 16:01:00 -10:00
Brian Smith
cda9d33d31 Use Rust for RSA exponentiation. 2018-11-29 16:01:00 -10:00
Brian Smith
d1d41719ad Remove unused GFp_has_aes_hardware.
In BoringSSL-based applications like Chromium, this is used to decide whether
to prefer ChaCha20-Poly1305 over AES-GCM. We'll eventually provide a similar
API that works differently.
2018-11-28 09:06:20 -10:00
Brian Smith
85d0b97a36 Clarify HWAES conditional compilation logic. 2018-11-28 08:39:28 -10:00
Brian Smith
30468ee8f4 Clean up prototypes of HWAES functions.
Replace the unprefixed prototypes with prefixed ones, remove redundant
prototypes, and remove prototypes for functions that were removed.
2018-11-27 23:51:10 -10:00
Brian Smith
f0d2944f4f Cherry-pick BoringSSL 0f5ecd3: Re-enable AES-NI on 32-bit x86 too. 2018-11-27 23:48:22 -10:00
Brian Smith
d05bdd5856 Merge BoringSSL 2745ef9: Also accept __ARM_NEON 2018-11-27 23:10:52 -10:00
Brian Smith
28210dd67a Merge BoringSSL adeb72b: Fix r = p-n+epsilon ECDSA tests. 2018-11-27 23:00:50 -10:00
Brian Smith
2fdd7d3fd6 Merge BoringSSL fbec517: Better test boundary cases of ec_cmp_x_coordinate.
Take the tests for digests that need to be reduced while we're at it.
2018-11-27 22:55:51 -10:00
Brian Smith
9c0681c832 Merge BoringSSL 9edbc7f.
The code isn't hooked up yet. Since the fix for the initial problem
with this code was in C code that isn't being used in *ring*, add a
note about the additional prerequisite.
2018-11-27 22:12:54 -10:00
Brian Smith
8d42286d98 Merge BoringSSL 3d450d2: Speed up ECDSA verify on x86-64.
The new modular inversion code isn't hooked up yet. The other stuff was
already being done by *ring*.
2018-11-27 16:53:50 -10:00
Brian Smith
6f4cef20c0 Merge BoringSSL c1eef7f: [perlasm] Hide OPENSSL_armcap_P in assembly. 2018-11-27 16:00:09 -10:00
Brian Smith
b9b2e57a59 Remove dead code in aesni-gcm-x86_64.pl. 2018-11-27 00:56:43 -10:00
Brian Smith
2d8a063f68 Revert "Replace GFp_bn_mul_mont_check_num_limbs with Rust code."
This reverts commit a5acc1b6a045d76d61ed2d0ddf139153edd028eb. This
change has a prerequisite that needs to land first.
2018-11-26 18:51:36 -10:00
Brian Smith
a5acc1b6a0 Replace GFp_bn_mul_mont_check_num_limbs with Rust code. 2018-11-26 16:05:41 -10:00
Brian Smith
72f5efd17f Fix name of LIMB_shr.
It was named `LIMB_shl` but it's a right shift.
2018-11-25 16:38:34 -10:00
Brian Smith
09ab5b73c6 Refactor limbs_minimal_bits.
Refactor the code to make it clearer how (timing) side channels are
avoided, and to make it a total function. Move this generic logic from
`rsa` to `limbs`.
2018-11-15 22:12:21 -10:00
Brian Smith
740032b9b7 Fix build with MSVC 2017 15.9.1. 2018-11-15 16:17:40 -10:00
Brian Smith
be59434c42 Remove redundant includes of <stdint.h> and <stddef.h>. 2018-11-15 16:17:40 -10:00
Brian Smith
45e9714da9 Remove redundant includes of <assert.h>. 2018-11-15 16:17:39 -10:00
Brian Smith
975a2c29f1 Remove unneeded __cplusplus ifdefs. 2018-11-15 16:17:39 -10:00
Brian Smith
5c8f13a721 Remove unused polyval.c. 2018-11-15 16:17:39 -10:00
Brian Smith
934401aa92 Cherry-pick part of BoringSSL c629e8b6880960a56f6bbbc2731a3537e1c616ce.
Use the names and documentation for `gmult_func` and `ghash_func`.
2018-11-15 11:52:00 -10:00
Adam Langley
e0e9d76047 Cherry-pick BoringSSL e77c27d: Automatically disable assembly with MSAN.
This should unbreak the build.
2018-11-14 16:24:32 -10:00
Brian Smith
bb522fba36 Merge BoringSSL 695e589: Include newlines at the end of generated asm. 2018-11-13 16:56:32 -10:00
Brian Smith
fd118ce114 Merge BoringSSL 2e74fda: Don't redefine alignas in C++. 2018-11-13 16:23:23 -10:00
Adam Langley
2745ef9082 Also accept __ARM_NEON
The Clang used in the Android SDK, at least, defines both __ARM_NEON__
and __ARM_NEON for ARMv7, but only the latter for AArch64.

This change switches each use of __ARM_NEON__ to accept either.

Change-Id: I3b5d5badc9ff0210888fd456e9329dc53a2b9b09
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/33104
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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2018-11-12 22:12:08 +00:00
David Benjamin
76e441bd66 Remove some easy BN_CTXs.
Change-Id: Ie7ff03a2c5b2ae8f56816b02182df40ce7ca0065
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/33066
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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2018-11-12 22:04:40 +00:00
David Benjamin
be11d6d8d7 Push BIGNUM out of the cmp_x_coordinate interface.
This removes the failure cases for cmp_x_coordinate, this clearing our
earlier dilemma.

Change-Id: I057f705e49b0fb5c3fc9616ee8962a3024097b24
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/33065
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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2018-11-12 21:46:36 +00:00
David Benjamin
fa3aadcd40 Push BIGNUM out of EC_METHOD's affine coordinates hook.
This is in preparation for removing the BIGNUM from cmp_x_coordinate.

Change-Id: Id8394248e3019a4897c238289f039f436a13679d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/33064
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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2018-11-12 21:32:53 +00:00
David Benjamin
adeb72b353 Fix r = p-n+epsilon ECDSA tests.
I forgot to refresh the public key in those tests, so they weren't
actually testing what they were supposed to. With this fix, injecting
too larger of a P_MINUS_ORDER into p256-x86_64.c now breaks tests.

Change-Id: I5d10a85c84b09629448beef67c86de607525fc71
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/33044
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2018-11-12 16:34:45 +00:00
David Benjamin
4706ea728e Inline ec_GFp_simple_group_get_degree.
This function is not EC_METHOD-specific, nor is there any reason it
would be (we do not support GF2m).

Change-Id: I4896cd16a107ad6a99be445a0dc0896293e8c8f9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/32884
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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2018-11-08 23:56:02 +00:00
David Benjamin
fbec517255 Better test boundary cases of ec_cmp_x_coordinate.
This is done in preparation of generalizing the optimization to all our
EC_METHODs.

Wycheproof happily does cover the case where x needed a reduction, but
they don't appear to check x being just above or below n, only x = p - 1
(adjusted downwards). Also we can tailor the test vectors a bit to the
x == r*z^2 (mod p) strategy to make sure we don't mess that up.

Additionally, the scenario is different for n > p. There is also the
nuisance of EC_FELEM vs EC_SCALAR having different widths. All our
built-in curves are well-behaved (same width, and consistently p < n),
but secp160r1 is reachable from custom curves and violates both
properties. Generate some tests to cover it as well.

Change-Id: Iefa5ebfe689a81870be21f04f5962ab161d38dab
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/32985
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2018-11-08 23:52:07 +00:00
Adam Langley
26b3fb0a77 Fix build when bcm.c is split up.
Some of the ec files now reference ECDSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE. Instead, lift the
error-pushing to ecdsa.c.

Change-Id: Ice3e7a22c5099756599df0ab0b215c0752ada4ee
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/32984
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2018-11-08 22:35:51 +00:00
Adam Langley
9edbc7ff9f Revert "Revert "Speed up ECDSA verify on x86-64.""
This reverts commit e907ed4c4b92cd7cea250240e32695c73dacf7eb. CPUID
checks have been added so hopefully this time sticks.

Change-Id: I5e0e5b87427c1230132681f936b3c70bac8263b8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/32924
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2018-11-07 23:57:22 +00:00
David Benjamin
ffbf95ad41 Devirtualize ec_simple_{add,dbl}.
Now that the tuned add/dbl implementations are exposed, these can be
specific to EC_GFp_mont_method and call the felem_mul and felem_sqr
implementations directly.

felem_sqr and felem_mul are still used elsewhere in simple.c, however,
so we cannot get rid of them yet.

Change-Id: I5ea22a8815279931afc98a6fc578bc85e3f8bdcc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/32849
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2018-11-06 18:32:11 +00:00
Adam Langley
e907ed4c4b Revert "Speed up ECDSA verify on x86-64."
This reverts commit 3d450d2844db825a906fc19f7bb1e6ce765047db. It fails
SDE, looks like a missing CPUID check before using vector instructions.

Change-Id: I6b7dd71d9e5b1f509d2e018bd8be38c973476b4e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/32864
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2018-11-06 00:29:15 +00:00
David Benjamin
cfd50c63a1 Route the tuned add/dbl implementations out of EC_METHOD.
Some consumer stumbled upon EC_POINT_{add,dbl} being faster with a
"custom" P-224 curve than the built-in one and made "custom" clones to
work around this. Before the EC_FELEM refactor, EC_GFp_nistp224_method
used BN_mod_mul for all reductions in fallback point arithmetic (we
primarily support the multiplication functions and keep the low-level
point arithmetic for legacy reasons) which took quite a performance hit.

EC_FELEM fixed this, but standalone felem_{mul,sqr} calls out of
nistp224 perform a lot of reductions, rather than batching them up as
that implementation is intended. So it is still slightly faster to use a
"custom" curve.

Custom curves are the last thing we want to encourage, so just route the
tuned implementations out of EC_METHOD to close this gap. Now the
built-in implementation is always solidly faster than (or identical to)
the custom clone.  This also reduces the number of places where we mix
up tuned vs. generic implementation, which gets us closer to making
EC_POINT's representation EC_METHOD-specific.

Change-Id: I843e1101a6208eaabb56d29d342e886e523c78b4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/32848
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2018-11-06 00:17:19 +00:00
Nir Drucker
3d450d2844 Speed up ECDSA verify on x86-64.
This commit improves the performance of ECDSA signature verification
(over NIST P-256 curve) for x86 platforms. The speedup is by a factor of 1.15x.
It does so by:
  1) Leveraging the fact that the verification does not need
     to run in constant time. To this end, we implemented:
    a) the function ecp_nistz256_points_mul_public in a similar way to
       the current ecp_nistz256_points_mul function by removing its constant
       time features.
    b) the Binary Extended Euclidean Algorithm (BEEU) in x86 assembly to
       replace the current modular inverse function used for the inversion.
  2) The last step in the ECDSA_verify function compares the (x) affine
     coordinate with the signature (r) value. Converting x from the Jacobian's
     representation to the affine coordinate requires to perform one inversions
     (x_affine = x * z^(-2)). We save this inversion and speed up the computations
     by instead bringing r to x (r_jacobian = r*z^2) which is faster.

The measured results are:
Before (on a Kaby Lake desktop with gcc-5):
Did 26000 ECDSA P-224 signing operations in 1002372us (25938.5 ops/sec)
Did 11000 ECDSA P-224 verify operations in 1043821us (10538.2 ops/sec)
Did 55000 ECDSA P-256 signing operations in 1017560us (54050.9 ops/sec)
Did 17000 ECDSA P-256 verify operations in 1051280us (16170.8 ops/sec)

After (on a Kaby Lake desktop with gcc-5):
Did 27000 ECDSA P-224 signing operations in 1011287us (26698.7 ops/sec)
Did 11640 ECDSA P-224 verify operations in 1076698us (10810.8 ops/sec)
Did 55000 ECDSA P-256 signing operations in 1016880us (54087.0 ops/sec)
Did 20000 ECDSA P-256 verify operations in 1038736us (19254.2 ops/sec)

Before (on a Skylake server platform with gcc-5):
Did 25000 ECDSA P-224 signing operations in 1021651us (24470.2 ops/sec)
Did 10373 ECDSA P-224 verify operations in 1046563us (9911.5 ops/sec)
Did 50000 ECDSA P-256 signing operations in 1002774us (49861.7 ops/sec)
Did 15000 ECDSA P-256 verify operations in 1006471us (14903.6 ops/sec)

After (on a Skylake server platform with gcc-5):
Did 25000 ECDSA P-224 signing operations in 1020958us (24486.8 ops/sec)
Did 10373 ECDSA P-224 verify operations in 1046359us (9913.4 ops/sec)
Did 50000 ECDSA P-256 signing operations in 1003996us (49801.0 ops/sec)
Did 18000 ECDSA P-256 verify operations in 1021604us (17619.4 ops/sec)

Developers and authors:
***************************************************************************
Nir Drucker (1,2), Shay Gueron (1,2)
(1) Amazon Web Services Inc.
(2) University of Haifa, Israel
***************************************************************************

Change-Id: Idd42a7bc40626bce974ea000b61fdb5bad33851c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/31304
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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2018-11-05 23:48:07 +00:00
Adam Langley
7f7e5e231e Include details about latest FIPS certification.
Change-Id: I84cda22a1086bce0da4797afae7975b3f39625de
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/32844
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2018-11-05 19:03:25 +00:00
David Benjamin
e62bf02a13 Don't overflow state->calls on 16TiB RAND_bytes calls.
This is an extremely important and practical use case. The comment that
state->calls is bounded by the reseed interval isn't quite true. We only
check on entry to the function, which means that it may exceed it by one
call's worth. Switch it to a size_t (which doesn't actually increase
memory because the struct was already padded).

Change-Id: Ia7646fd5b4142789c1d613280223baa4cd1a4a9b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/32804
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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2018-11-02 18:33:43 +00:00
Steven Valdez
c8e0f90f83 Add an interface for QUIC integration.
0-RTT support and APIs to consume NewSessionTicket will be added in a
follow-up.

Change-Id: Ib2b2c6b618b3e33a74355fb53fdbd2ffafcc5c56
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/31744
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
2018-10-31 20:38:10 +00:00
David Benjamin
42d723f634 Test CBC padding more aggressively.
tls_cbc.c is concerned with the variation in where the padding+mac may
end, counted in blocks. Hash blocks are larger than block cipher blocks,
and the hash itself appends some padding. Thus maximal padding off a
64-hash.Size() bytes may not fully stress things.

Just run all inputs modulo the hash block size, so we don't have to
think very hard about the "most difficult" input.

Change-Id: I8da1427dfff855931c14a9135c22afbff4f367c0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/32724
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2018-10-30 20:53:00 +00:00
armfazh
144d924e0b Fix EVP_tls_cbc_digest_record is slow using SHA-384 and short messages
Symptom: When using larger hash functions and short messages,
these six blocks take too much time to be conditionally copied.

Observations:
 - SHA-384 consumes more data per iteration, unlike SHA-256.
 - The value of `kVarianceBlocks` must depend on the parameters
   of the selected hash algorithm.
 - Avoid magic constants.

Changes:
 - A new formula for the kVarianceBlocks value.
 - Stronger test vectors were created in change: 32724.
 - The new formula passes these tests.

Discussion:
 OpenSSL team: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7342
 Quoting mattcaswell:
> The "real" data that needs to be hashed has to be padded for the
> hashing algorithm. For SHA1 the smallest amount of padding that
> can be added is the "0x80" byte plus 8 bytes containing the message
> length, i.e. 9 bytes. If the data length is within 9 bytes of the
> end of the hash block boundary then the padding will push it into
> an extra block to be hashed.

Change-Id: Id1ad2389927014316eed2b453aac6e4c2a585c5c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/32624
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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2018-10-29 18:26:27 +00:00
David Benjamin
aa8d29dbd1 Tidy up dsa_sign_setup.
This function is not exported, so we don't need the optional BN_CTX
logic. Additionally, the cleanup code can be made a bit simpler and more
idiomatic.

Change-Id: Ib326eab4813fd9de9ac1df8fdc9e470c26aff092
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/32704
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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2018-10-25 21:51:57 +00:00
Dylan MacKenzie
b5153f0e38 Remove 192-bit key support from AES-NI assembly.
Since *ring* does not support AES with 192-bit keys, we can remove some
unused assembly code.

Comments are added to indicate that 192-bit key support was willfully
removed.

This extends the work done in commits
1103cf29dfbbf51f0dd8fb757084caa052863869 and
b3e91be71edde28f5d2884d3c3c34260b6a79378.

I agree to license my contributions to each file under the terms given
at the top of each file I changed.
2018-10-24 20:00:56 -10:00
David Benjamin
53d9fdd548 Fix the build on glibc 2.15.
glibc didn't add getauxval or sys/auxv.h until 2.16. glib 2.16.0 is six
years old and thus glibc 2.15 is past our support horizon, however
Android is using an outdated sysroot. Temporarily allow this until they
fix their toolchain.

Change-Id: I24e231cf40829e446969f67bf15c32e0b007de4c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/32686
Reviewed-by: Robert Sloan <varomodt@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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2018-10-24 17:39:48 +00:00
Dylan MacKenzie
20cfa87ea7 Make caller enforce invariants when setting AES encryption key
`GFp_AES_set_encrypt_key` can fail if and only if the following invariants
are violated.

* All pointer arguments must be non-null.
* The key size must be either 128 or 256 bits (192 bit keys aren't
supported).

The first invariant should not be checked at runtime (except via
assertion) as it is the responsibility of the caller.

The second could be expressed statically by accepting an enum with the
valid key lengths, but enums don't provide any type safety in C.
Instead, we document the acceptable key lengths and make them the
responsibility of the caller.

As a result of these changes, `GFp_AES_set_encrypt_key` (as well as
`GFp_aes_c_set_encrypt_key`) no longer needs to return an error code.
The assembly functions still return an error code and do input
validation.

This commit also corrects the signature of `GFp_AES_set_encrypt_key`.

I agree to license my contributions to each file under the terms given
at the top of each file I changed.
2018-10-23 19:08:11 -10:00