ring/src/rand.rs
Brian Smith 2843931bb7 Switch to Rust 2018 Edition.
Switch to Rust 2018 Edition. Fix up some build breakage for different
configurations that were found in the process of testing this,
particularly `--no-default-features`.
2018-12-08 21:39:17 -10:00

304 lines
10 KiB
Rust

// Copyright 2015-2016 Brian Smith.
//
// Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
// purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
// copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
//
// THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHORS DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES
// WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
// MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY
// SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
// WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
// OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
// CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
//! Cryptographic pseudo-random number generation.
//!
//! An application should create a single `SystemRandom` and then use it for
//! all randomness generation. Functions that generate random bytes should take
//! a `&SecureRandom` parameter instead of instantiating their own. Besides
//! being more efficient, this also helps document where non-deterministic
//! (random) outputs occur. Taking a reference to a `SecureRandom` also helps
//! with testing techniques like fuzzing, where it is useful to use a
//! (non-secure) deterministic implementation of `SecureRandom` so that results
//! can be replayed. Following this pattern also may help with sandboxing
//! (seccomp filters on Linux in particular). See `SystemRandom`'s
//! documentation for more details.
use crate::error;
/// A secure random number generator.
pub trait SecureRandom: private::Sealed {
/// Fills `dest` with random bytes.
fn fill(&self, dest: &mut [u8]) -> Result<(), error::Unspecified>;
}
/// A secure random number generator where the random values come directly
/// from the operating system.
///
/// A single `SystemRandom` may be shared across multiple threads safely.
///
/// `new()` is guaranteed to always succeed and to have low latency; it won't
/// try to open or read from a file or do similar things. The first call to
/// `fill()` may block a substantial amount of time since any and all
/// initialization is deferred to it. Therefore, it may be a good idea to call
/// `fill()` once at a non-latency-sensitive time to minimize latency for
/// future calls.
///
/// On Linux, `fill()` will use the [`getrandom`] syscall. If the kernel is too
/// old to support `getrandom` then by default `fill()` falls back to reading
/// from `/dev/urandom`. This decision is made the first time `fill`
/// *succeeds*. The fallback to `/dev/urandom` can be disabled by disabling the
/// `dev_urandom_fallback` default feature; this should be done whenever the
/// target system is known to support `getrandom`. Library crates should avoid
/// explicitly enabling the `dev_urandom_fallback` feature.
///
/// On macOS and iOS, `fill()` is implemented using `SecRandomCopyBytes`.
///
/// On Redox, `fill()` is implemented by reading from `rand:`.
///
/// On Windows, `fill` is implemented using the platform's API for secure
/// random number generation.
///
/// Otherwise, `fill()` is implemented by reading from `/dev/urandom`. (This is
/// something that should be improved for any platform that adds something
/// better.)
///
/// When `/dev/urandom` is used, a file handle for `/dev/urandom` won't be
/// opened until `fill` is called. In particular, `SystemRandom::new()` will
/// not open `/dev/urandom` or do other potentially-high-latency things. The
/// file handle will never be closed, until the operating system closes it at
/// process shutdown. All instances of `SystemRandom` will share a single file
/// handle.
///
/// On Linux, to properly implement seccomp filtering when the
/// `dev_urandom_fallback` default feature is disabled, allow `getrandom`
/// through. When the fallback is enabled, allow file opening, `getrandom`,
/// and `read` up until the first call to `fill()` succeeds. After that, allow
/// `getrandom` and `read`.
///
/// [`getrandom`]: http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/getrandom.2.html
pub struct SystemRandom;
impl SystemRandom {
/// Constructs a new `SystemRandom`.
#[inline(always)]
pub fn new() -> SystemRandom { SystemRandom }
}
impl SecureRandom for SystemRandom {
#[inline(always)]
fn fill(&self, dest: &mut [u8]) -> Result<(), error::Unspecified> { fill_impl(dest) }
}
impl private::Sealed for SystemRandom {}
#[cfg(not(any(target_os = "linux", target_os = "macos", target_os = "ios", windows)))]
use self::urandom::fill as fill_impl;
#[cfg(any(
all(target_os = "linux", not(feature = "dev_urandom_fallback")),
windows
))]
use self::sysrand::fill as fill_impl;
#[cfg(all(target_os = "linux", feature = "dev_urandom_fallback"))]
use self::sysrand_or_urandom::fill as fill_impl;
#[cfg(any(target_os = "macos", target_os = "ios"))]
use self::darwin::fill as fill_impl;
use crate::private;
#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
mod sysrand_chunk {
use crate::{c, error};
use libc;
extern "C" {
static GFp_SYS_GETRANDOM: c::long;
}
#[inline]
pub fn chunk(dest: &mut [u8]) -> Result<usize, error::Unspecified> {
let chunk_len: c::size_t = dest.len();
let flags: c::uint = 0;
let r = unsafe { libc::syscall(GFp_SYS_GETRANDOM, dest.as_mut_ptr(), chunk_len, flags) };
if r < 0 {
if unsafe { *libc::__errno_location() } == libc::EINTR {
// If an interrupt occurs while getrandom() is blocking to wait
// for the entropy pool, then EINTR is returned. Returning 0
// will cause the caller to try again.
return Ok(0);
}
return Err(error::Unspecified);
}
Ok(r as usize)
}
}
#[cfg(windows)]
mod sysrand_chunk {
use crate::{c, error};
use core;
#[link(name = "advapi32")]
extern "system" {
#[link_name = "SystemFunction036"]
#[must_use]
fn RtlGenRandom(
random_buffer: *mut u8, random_buffer_length: c::win32::ULONG,
) -> c::win32::BOOLEAN;
}
#[inline]
pub fn chunk(dest: &mut [u8]) -> Result<usize, error::Unspecified> {
assert!(core::mem::size_of::<usize>() >= core::mem::size_of::<c::win32::ULONG>());
let max_chunk_len = c::win32::ULONG::from(0u32).wrapping_sub(1) as usize;
assert_eq!(max_chunk_len, 0xffff_ffff);
let len = core::cmp::min(dest.len(), max_chunk_len);
if unsafe { RtlGenRandom(dest.as_mut_ptr(), len as c::win32::ULONG) } == 0 {
return Err(error::Unspecified);
}
Ok(len)
}
}
#[cfg(any(target_os = "linux", windows))]
mod sysrand {
use super::sysrand_chunk::chunk;
use crate::error;
pub fn fill(dest: &mut [u8]) -> Result<(), error::Unspecified> {
let mut read_len = 0;
while read_len < dest.len() {
let chunk_len = chunk(&mut dest[read_len..])?;
read_len += chunk_len;
}
Ok(())
}
}
// Keep the `cfg` conditions in sync with the conditions in lib.rs.
#[cfg(all(
any(target_os = "redox", unix),
not(any(target_os = "macos", target_os = "ios")),
not(all(target_os = "linux", not(feature = "dev_urandom_fallback")))
))]
mod urandom {
use crate::error;
use std;
pub fn fill(dest: &mut [u8]) -> Result<(), error::Unspecified> {
use lazy_static::lazy_static;
#[cfg(target_os = "redox")]
static RANDOM_PATH: &str = "rand:";
#[cfg(unix)]
static RANDOM_PATH: &str = "/dev/urandom";
lazy_static! {
static ref FILE: Result<std::fs::File, std::io::Error> =
std::fs::File::open(RANDOM_PATH);
}
match *FILE {
Ok(ref file) => {
use std::io::Read;
(&*file).read_exact(dest).map_err(|_| error::Unspecified)
},
Err(_) => Err(error::Unspecified),
}
}
}
// Keep the `cfg` conditions in sync with the conditions in lib.rs.
#[cfg(all(target_os = "linux", feature = "dev_urandom_fallback"))]
mod sysrand_or_urandom {
use crate::error;
enum Mechanism {
Sysrand,
DevURandom,
}
pub fn fill(dest: &mut [u8]) -> Result<(), error::Unspecified> {
use lazy_static::lazy_static;
lazy_static! {
static ref MECHANISM: Mechanism = {
let mut dummy = [0u8; 1];
if super::sysrand_chunk::chunk(&mut dummy[..]).is_err() {
Mechanism::DevURandom
} else {
Mechanism::Sysrand
}
};
}
match *MECHANISM {
Mechanism::Sysrand => super::sysrand::fill(dest),
Mechanism::DevURandom => super::urandom::fill(dest),
}
}
}
#[cfg(any(target_os = "macos", target_os = "ios"))]
mod darwin {
use crate::{c, error};
pub fn fill(dest: &mut [u8]) -> Result<(), error::Unspecified> {
let r = unsafe { SecRandomCopyBytes(kSecRandomDefault, dest.len(), dest.as_mut_ptr()) };
match r {
0 => Ok(()),
_ => Err(error::Unspecified),
}
}
// XXX: This is emulating an opaque type with a non-opaque type. TODO: Fix
// this when
// https://github.com/rust-lang/rfcs/pull/1861#issuecomment-274613536 is
// resolved.
#[repr(C)]
struct SecRandomRef([u8; 0]);
#[link(name = "Security", kind = "framework")]
extern "C" {
static kSecRandomDefault: &'static SecRandomRef;
// For now `rnd` must be `kSecRandomDefault`.
#[must_use]
fn SecRandomCopyBytes(
rnd: &'static SecRandomRef, count: c::size_t, bytes: *mut u8,
) -> c::int;
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use crate::rand::{self, SecureRandom};
#[test]
fn test_system_random_lengths() {
// Test that `fill` succeeds for various interesting lengths. `256` and
// multiples thereof are interesting because that's an edge case for
// `getrandom` on Linux.
let lengths = [0, 1, 2, 3, 96, 255, 256, 257, 511, 512, 513, 4096];
for len in lengths.iter() {
let mut buf = vec![0; *len];
let rng = rand::SystemRandom::new();
assert!(rng.fill(&mut buf).is_ok());
// If `len` < 96 then there's a big chance of false positives, but
// otherwise the likelihood of a false positive is so too low to
// worry about.
if *len >= 96 {
assert!(buf.iter().any(|x| *x != 0));
}
}
}
}