ring/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c
Bob Beck dcabfe2d89 Make OPENSSL_malloc push ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE on failure.
Remove all the other ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURES from the
codebase.

Also changes cbb to push to the error stack, to correctly
report cbb failures instead of now only reporting
malloc failures. Previously it turned all cbb failures
into a malloc failure

Bug: 564

Change-Id: Ic13208bf9d9aaa470e83b2f15782fc94946bbc7b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/57046
Auto-Submit: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
2023-02-13 22:13:11 +00:00

296 lines
9.5 KiB
C

/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
*
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/asn1.h>
#include <openssl/digest.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/mem.h>
#include <openssl/obj.h>
#include <openssl/stack.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include "../internal.h"
#include "../x509v3/internal.h"
#include "internal.h"
int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) {
return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->issuer, b->cert_info->issuer));
}
int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) {
return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->subject, b->cert_info->subject));
}
int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b) {
return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl->issuer, b->crl->issuer));
}
int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b) {
return OPENSSL_memcmp(a->crl_hash, b->crl_hash, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH);
}
X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(const X509 *a) {
return a->cert_info->issuer;
}
unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x) {
return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->issuer));
}
unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x) {
return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->issuer));
}
X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(const X509 *a) {
return a->cert_info->subject;
}
ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a) {
return a->cert_info->serialNumber;
}
const ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get0_serialNumber(const X509 *x509) {
return x509->cert_info->serialNumber;
}
unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x) {
return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->subject));
}
unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x) {
return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->subject));
}
// Compare two certificates: they must be identical for this to work. NB:
// Although "cmp" operations are generally prototyped to take "const"
// arguments (eg. for use in STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these
// operations may involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring
// certain cert information is cached. So this is the point where the
// "depth-first" constification tree has to halt with an evil cast.
int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) {
// Fill in the |cert_hash| fields.
//
// TODO(davidben): This may fail, in which case the the hash will be all
// zeros. This produces a consistent comparison (failures are sticky), but
// not a good one. OpenSSL now returns -2, but this is not a consistent
// comparison and may cause misbehaving sorts by transitivity. For now, we
// retain the old OpenSSL behavior, which was to ignore the error. See
// https://crbug.com/boringssl/355.
x509v3_cache_extensions((X509 *)a);
x509v3_cache_extensions((X509 *)b);
return OPENSSL_memcmp(a->cert_hash, b->cert_hash, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH);
}
int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b) {
int ret;
// Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date
if (!a->canon_enc || a->modified) {
ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL);
if (ret < 0) {
return -2;
}
}
if (!b->canon_enc || b->modified) {
ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL);
if (ret < 0) {
return -2;
}
}
ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen;
if (ret) {
return ret;
}
return OPENSSL_memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen);
}
unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x) {
unsigned long ret = 0;
unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
// Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding
i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
if (!EVP_Digest(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md, NULL, EVP_sha1(), NULL)) {
return 0;
}
ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)) &
0xffffffffL;
return ret;
}
// I now DER encode the name and hash it. Since I cache the DER encoding,
// this is reasonably efficient.
unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x) {
EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
unsigned long ret = 0;
unsigned char md[16];
// Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding
i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
// EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL) &&
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length) &&
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL)) {
ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)) &
0xffffffffL;
}
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
return ret;
}
X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(const STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name,
const ASN1_INTEGER *serial) {
if (serial->type != V_ASN1_INTEGER && serial->type != V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER) {
return NULL;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
X509 *x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(X509_get0_serialNumber(x509), serial) == 0 &&
X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x509), name) == 0) {
return x509;
}
}
return NULL;
}
X509 *X509_find_by_subject(const STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
X509 *x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509), name) == 0) {
return x509;
}
}
return NULL;
}
EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x) {
if ((x == NULL) || (x->cert_info == NULL)) {
return NULL;
}
return (X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info->key));
}
ASN1_BIT_STRING *X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(const X509 *x) {
if (!x) {
return NULL;
}
return x->cert_info->key->public_key;
}
int X509_check_private_key(X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *k) {
EVP_PKEY *xk;
int ret;
xk = X509_get_pubkey(x);
if (xk) {
ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k);
} else {
ret = -2;
}
switch (ret) {
case 1:
break;
case 0:
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH);
break;
case -1:
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH);
break;
case -2:
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE);
}
if (xk) {
EVP_PKEY_free(xk);
}
if (ret > 0) {
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
// Not strictly speaking an "up_ref" as a STACK doesn't have a reference
// count but it has the same effect by duping the STACK and upping the ref of
// each X509 structure.
STACK_OF(X509) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain) {
STACK_OF(X509) *ret = sk_X509_dup(chain);
if (ret == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ret); i++) {
X509_up_ref(sk_X509_value(ret, i));
}
return ret;
}